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.1 Introduction
The idea that preferences over uncertain outcomes may depend on the state
of nature in which a given outcome is realised seems intuitively appealing.
Common examples include states of nature associated with death, injury,
illness or accident. Karni (1985) formalized this idea, presenting a state-
dependent version of the expected utility model. Karni (1987) extended the
analysis to generalized expected utility theory.
A crucial issue in any analysis of preferences concerning uncertainty is the
concept of risk-aversion. Important aspects of this issue include the de￿nition
of risk-aversion, comparisons of the riskiness of alternative state-contingent
consumption bundles, comparisons of risk-aversion between individuals and
comparisons of risk aversion for a given individual at di⁄erent wealth levels.
In particular, the hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
has played a central role in comparative static analysis.
Karni (1983,1985, 1987) analyzes a number of these issues. His central
idea that the set of riskless outcomes may be replaced by a more general
reference set, representing the most desirable allocation of possible wealth
levels at actuarially fair prices. Karni develops a notion of DARA for state-
contingent preferences. However, this notion is relevant to autocomparable
preferences (those characterized by a¢ ne reference sets). and, Except for the
case of additively separable (state-dependent expected utility) preferences, it
does not yield sharp comparative static results.
The idea that preferences may be state-dependent ￿ts naturally with an
analysis of uncertainty based on a representation of random variables as state-
contingent consumption or production bundles analogous to consumption
and production bundles in standard consumer and producer theory. Cham-
bers and Quiggin (2000) show that the state-contingent approach may be
used to characterise risk aversion using standard tools of modern consumer
theory such as expenditure functions. Chambers and Quiggin (2003) develop
a range of primal and dual measures of risk aversion.
This paper shows how these concepts of risk-aversion may be extended
to the case of state-dependent preferences, whether or not these preferences
are autocomparable. We characterize autocomparability as a special case.
We show how standard comparative static results, originally derived for the
state-independent expected utility model, may be extended to general state-
dependent preferences, without the requirement for additive separability.
12 Notation
We consider preferences over random variables represented as mappings from
a state space ￿ to a convex outcome space Y ￿ <. Our focus is on the case
where ￿ is a ￿nite set f1;:::Sg, and the space of random variables is Y S ￿ <S.
The unit vector is denoted 1 = (1;1;:::1), and we de￿ne ei as the i-th row of
the S ￿ S identity matrix
ei = (0;:::;1;0;:::;0):
Probabilistic beliefs are de￿ned by a vector b ￿ 2 <S
+ such that
P
s ^ ￿s = 1:
The way in which such beliefs may be elicited from individuals with state-
dependent preferences, is discussed by Karni (1999) and Grant and Karni
(2005).
Preferences over state-contingent incomes are given by an ordinal map-
ping W : <S ! <. W is continuous, nondecreasing, and quasi-concave in y.
The least-as-good sets associated with this preference ordering are given by
V (w) = fy :W (y) ￿ wg:












(where each us : < ! < is assumed concave).
For any vector of state-contingent prices;p 2<S
++; and given income, m;
we can represent W by the indirect utility function
I (p;m) = max
y fW (y) : py ￿mg:
The associated expenditure function is de￿ned:
E (p;w) = inf fpy : y 2 V (w)g
= inf fm : I (p;m) ￿ wg:
2De￿ne
^ y(p;w) = argminfp
0y :W (y) ￿ wg
= @E (p;w):
Here @ denotes the superdi⁄erential with respect to p. Thus, ^ y(p;w) is the
set of state-contingent income vectors that would minimise the cost of achiev-
ing welfare level w; given state-contingent prices p. For strictly quasiconcave
W; ^ y(p;w) is a singleton.
3 Reference sets and risk premiums
Karni (1985) de￿nes the reference set as ￿...the optimal distribution of wealth
across states of nature that is chosen by a risk-averse decision maker facing
fair insurance￿at the objective probabilities b ￿ . For income m; this distribu-
tion is given by ^ y(^ ￿;I (p;m)):1 For given y; the element (or, more generally
subset) of the reference set yielding welfare W (y) is the reference equivalent
^ y(^ ￿;W (y)): Thus the expenditure on the reference equivalent
^ ￿
0^ y(^ ￿;W (y)) = E (^ ￿;W(y))
may be interpreted as the reference-equivalent income (or minimal-equivalent
income).
The reference set corresponds in a consumer context to the consumer￿ s
income-expansion path given ^ ￿: For given ^ ￿, the reference set, ^ Y (^ ￿) ￿ <S;
is thus
^ Y (^ ￿) = [w f^ y(^ ￿;w)g:
For strictly risk-averse, probabilistically sophisticated, state-independent pref-
erences with subjective probabilities ^ ￿; ^ Y (^ ￿); the reference set for the price
vector p = ^ ￿; is simply the certainty ray fc1 :c 2 <g: This can easily be
checked for the case of expected-utility preferences (1). By contrast, for
state-dependent expected-utility preferences (2), the reference set will not
coincide with the certainty ray when the price vector p coincides with the
decision maker￿ s beliefs ^ ￿; unless all the utility functions us are identical (up
to an additive shift).
1^ y(^ ￿;m) need not be unique. In particular, for risk-neutral preferences, any y will be
an element of the reference set for m = ^ ￿
0y: However, we will focus attention on the case
of strictly risk-averse preferences, where ^ y(^ ￿;m) is unique.
33.1 Risk premiums
Following the standard analysis of the state-independent and state-dependent
cases, we de￿ne absolute and relative risk premiums
a(y; ^ ￿) = ^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;W (y))
r(y; ^ ￿) =
^ ￿
0y
E (^ ￿;W (y))
The absolute risk premium is the di⁄erence between the value of y using
^ ￿ and the reference-equivalent income, that is minimal expenditure required
to reach the same level of preference as y at prices ^ ￿: It is evident that
a(y; ^ ￿) is the Hicksian equivalent variation for a shift to y from ^ y(^ ￿;W (y))
and that the literature on consumer surplus and other approximations to
the compensating and equivalent variations can be applied to yield close
approximations for a(y; ^ ￿) and related measures (e.g., Diewert, 1992).
We can express the risk premium as the di⁄erence between two expendi-
ture functions. Let y￿ 2 Y (^ ￿) and ￿0y￿ = ￿0y; then
a(y; ^ ￿) = E (^ ￿;W (y
￿)) ￿ E (^ ￿;W (y))
= E (^ ￿;W (y + (y
￿ ￿ y))) ￿ E (^ ￿;W (y));
so that we can think of the risk premium as the willingness to pay to avoid
the actuarially fair risk (y￿ ￿ y):
Observe that by the de￿nition of the expenditure function
^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;W (y));
so that a(y; ^ ￿) ￿ 0 with equality if and only if y 2 Y (^ ￿):
Similar interpretations are available for the relative risk premium, and we
may derive r(y; ^ ￿) ￿ 1 with equality only for y 2 Y (^ ￿):
4 Comparisons of risk and risk aversion
4.1 Risk orderings for equal mean sets
In state-independent utility, a variety of risk orderings, ￿; are used, where
y ￿ y0 corresponds to various interpretations of the statement ￿ y is less risky
than y0￿ . In all such orderings, the least risky state-contingent vectors are
4non-stochastic vectors of the form c1: Risk-averse preferences are then char-
acterized by the requirement that W (y) ￿ W (￿1) where ￿ = ^ ￿
0y: Most
risk orderings relate only variables with the same mean, and are translation-
invariant in the sense that, for all ￿;y;y0 :
y ￿ y
0 , y+￿ 1 ￿ y
0+￿1
Thus, riskiness may be seen as a property of deviations from certainty, of the
general form
" = y￿(^ ￿
0y)1
Hence, given a risk-ordering ￿ we derive the induced risk ordering ￿￿ on
M = f" : ^ ￿
0" =0g such that
" ￿
￿ "
0 , " + ￿1 ￿ "
0+￿1; 8￿
It is useful to apply this interpretation to speci￿c risk orderings used
in the literature. We follow the notation of Quiggin and Chambers (2004).
Consider the following examples.
Example 1 The minimal risk ordering consistent with risk aversion, re-
quiring that receipt of mean income with certainty is preferred to the cor-
responding risky state-contingent income vector is denoted ￿0 : The only
risk-ordering relationships implied by ￿0 are of the form ￿(y)1 ￿0 y. This




0 "; " 2 M:
Example 2 Consider the multiplicative-spread risk ordering, ￿1;described
by
￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)(^ ￿
0y)1 ￿1 y; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1




1 "; " 2 M; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
Example 3 The monotone spread ordering is given by
y ￿m y + "
where ^ ￿
0" =0 and " is comonotonic with y; that is, for any s;t
(ys ￿ yt)("s ￿ "t) ￿ 0
5This ordering is translation invariant, and induces the ordering ￿￿
m on M
" ￿m " + "
0
for ";"0 comonotonic.
4.2 General risk orderings
To extend this analysis to the case of state-dependent preferences, we replace
the certainty ray with Y (^ ￿) and de￿ne
M (y; ^ ￿) = Y (^ ￿) \ f~ y : ^ ￿
0 (~ y ￿ y) = 0g
as the set of points on the reference set that has the same mean as y: When
the reference set is a one-dimensional manifold, M (y; ^ ￿) is a singleton.
Now we can apply risk orderings on the basis of deviations of the form
" = y ￿ M (y; ^ ￿): (3)
yielding
M (y; ^ ￿) ￿ 0y;
￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)M (y; ^ ￿) ￿ 1y; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1;
y ￿ my + ~ "
where ^ ￿
0~ " = 0 and ~ " is comonotonic with some element of y ￿ M (y; ^ ￿):
Intuitively, the de￿nition of ￿0 says that points on the reference set are less
risky than points o⁄ it with the same mean. The de￿nition of ￿1 says that
riskiness increases as we move along any line segment from M (y; ^ ￿) to y are
less risky. The comonotone order has the same properties as in the standard
case.
With this construction, it is straightforward to relax the requirement that
risk orderings should relate only variables with the same mean. Observe that
if w = I (^ ￿; ^ ￿
0y); we have
y = ^ y(^ ￿;w) + "
where " is as in (3). Similarly denote
y
0 = ^ y(^ ￿;w
0) + "
0
6and any of the orderings ￿ discussed above can be extended to a partial
order on Y S de￿ned by
y ￿ y
0 , " ￿ "
0
In the remainder of this paper, we will use ￿0;￿1and ￿mto denote these
more general orderings.
4.3 Risk aversion
An important reason for de￿ning a generalized risk premium is to permit
the comparison of risk aversion across individuals. As Karni (1985) observes,
comparisons of risk aversion are feasible for individuals who share common
beliefs ^ ￿ and a reference set Y (^ ￿): Comparing two individuals i and j who
have common beliefs and a common reference set, we say that i is (absolutely)
more risk-averse than j if for all y
a
i (y; ^ ￿) ￿ a
j (y; ^ ￿): (4)
Departures from the objective probabilities incur greater costs in maintaining
the reference utility for the more risk-averse person. Equivalently i is more


























This also implies a notion of relatively more risk averse by a parallel de￿ni-
tion. More signi￿cantly, it implies that more risk averse people are character-
ized by the requirement that given state-claim prices corresponding to their
probabilities, they would always spend less on attaining the level of utility
o⁄ered by y than less risk averse individuals.
It may seem counterintuitive that more risk-averse individuals should
spend less on their reference equivalent than less risk-averse individual. How-
ever, this has an exact parallel in state-independent expected utility theory in
more risk-averse individuals having lower certainty equivalents than less risk-
averse individuals. Given that the expansion path is monotonically increas-
ing in w, more risk-averse individuals always ￿nd their reference-equivalent
consumption bundle ￿closer to the origin￿in the reference set than less risk-
averse individuals.
7More general comparisons of risk aversion are also useful. Suppose ￿ is
a risk ordering for both i and j:Then, we say that i is more risk-averse than




0; ^ ￿) ￿ a
i (y; ^ ￿) ￿ a
j (y
0; ^ ￿) ￿ a

























This paragraph is still garbled. I think you sent me the wrong
version, but just in case, I will try to be a little clearer about what
I am objecting to. There is notation that is not de￿ned. We do
not have a de￿nition of ￿Y or ￿P : What do they order and where
do they come from. I also question the notational wisdom of using
￿I to denote the ordering on I because up until this point, this no-
tation has referred to risk orderings. Regardless, everything needs
to be de￿ned and clearly so people can understand what￿ s going
on. This de￿nition may be restated in the terminology of supermodular-
ity theory (Topkis, 1998). Consider a family I of individuals with common
beliefs ^ ￿ and a common expansion path Y (^ ￿)and an ordering ￿I on I: If
(5) holds whenever j ￿I i; then the risk premium ai (y; ^ ￿) and the expen-
diture function Ei (^ ￿;W i (y)) display increasing di⁄erences in i;y relative to
the orderings ￿Y and ￿I Equivalently an ordering ￿I on I is an ordering
of risk aversion, given ￿P if ai (y; ^ ￿) and Ei (^ ￿;W i (y)) are supermodular
in i and y; given the orderings ￿Y and ￿I : Note that the di⁄erence be-
tween ai (y; ^ ￿) and Ei (^ ￿;W i (y)) is given by ^ ￿
0y which is a valuation on
y; so that supermodularity of ai (y; ^ ￿) is equivalent to supermodularity of
Ei (^ ￿;W i (y))
The general de￿nition in terms of supermodularity theory reduces to the
basic de￿nition (4) if we consider the ordering ￿0 de￿ned by the sole require-
ment y(^ ￿; ^ ￿y) ￿ y; 8y: y(^ ￿; ^ ￿y) is leftover from an old version, we
need to replace it.
5 Constant, decreasing and increasing risk aver-
sion
Concepts of constant, decreasing and increasing risk aversion play a crucial
role in the literature on problems of economic choice under uncertainty that
8has been developed for state-independent models of preferences. If models
of state-dependent preferences are to be applied to such problems, it is im-
portant to consider the extent to which such concepts can be generalized.
We will focus on absolute risk aversion. The extension to concepts of con-
stant, decreasing and increasing relative risk aversion is straightforward if
the reference set is a ray from the origin, but more complex in other cases.
5.1 Constant risk aversion and linear risk tolerance
With state-independent preferences, risk-averse for probabilities ^ ￿; the ref-
erence set for ^ ￿ is the bisector or certainty ray c1: Under constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA), for any p; the expansion path is parallel to c1: It fol-
lows that, in any standard2 choice problem, an increase in wealth of ￿ simply
produces a shift of ￿1 in the optimal consumption vector. Similarly, under
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the expansion path is a ray from the
origin. This leads us to the following de￿nition of these concepts in terms of
reference sets.
De￿nition 4 Preferences satisfy constant absolute risk aversionif for all ^ ￿,
Y (^ ￿)+￿1 ￿ Y (^ ￿); ￿ 2 <: Preference satisfy constant relative risk aversion
if for all ^ ￿, ￿Y (^ ￿) ￿ Y (^ ￿); ￿ > 0:
Ordinal preferences, therefore, satisfy CARA if there exists a utility nor-
malization such that, for all ￿;
E (￿;w) = E (￿;0) + w￿
01
= E (￿;0) + w
under the normalization that ￿01 = 1 (which is harmless for probabilities).
Hence,
Y (^ ￿) = @E (^ ￿;0) + [w fw1g
The primal implication is that
V (w) = V (0) + w1;
which is equivalent to the de￿nition in terms of reference sets.
2A standard choice problem is one involving allocation of wealth across a range of assets
or other activiities, such that changes in wealth shift the choice set parallel to c1:
9Similarly, ordinal preferences satisfy CRRA if there exists a utility nor-
malization (w > 0) such that for all ￿;
E (￿;w) = wE (￿;1);
so that
Y (^ ￿) = [w fw@E (^ ￿;1)g
The primal implication is that
V (w) = wV (1):
We, therefore, generalize the notion of CARA as follows
De￿nition Preferences display nonlinear CARA if
V (w) = V (0) + g (w);
with g : < ! <S and g (0) = 0:
Thus, preferences display nonlinear CARA if and only if
E (￿;w) = E (￿;0) + ￿
0g (w);
so that preferences are risk averse with respect to ^ ￿ if and only if
^ Y (^ ￿) = @E (^ ￿;0) + [w fg (w)g:
Under this de￿nition expansion paths are ￿ parallel￿to the manifold [w fg (w)g;
which allows for nonlinear responsiveness to real wealth (w) changes.
That is, all income e⁄ects on state-contingent incomes are independent
(in a direct sense) of state-contingent prices. The income e⁄ects are measured
by g (w) and by the rate at which w changes with income. Let the vector of
partial derivatives of g (w) with respect to w be denoted g0 (w) 2 <S: Then,
presuming di⁄erentiability, the income e⁄ects are measured by
@
@m
g (I (￿;m)) = g




10This leads to an absolute risk premium of the form
a(y; ^ ￿) = ^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;W (y))
= ^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;0) ￿ ^ ￿
0g (W (y)):
which implies:
Proposition 5 Preferences display nonlinear CARA if and only if the ab-
solute risk premium a(y; ^ ￿) is constant for shifts parallel to the reference set.
That is, for any w and y 2 V (0)
a(y+g (w); ^ ￿) = a(y; ^ ￿)
P roof. For y 2 V (0)
a(y; ^ ￿) = ^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;0):
Under nonlinear CARA for y 2 V (0); y + g (w) 2 V (w); whence
a(y+g (w); ^ ￿) = ^ ￿
0y + ^ ￿
0g (w) ￿ E (^ ￿;0) ￿ ^ ￿
0g (w)
= ^ ￿
0y ￿ E (^ ￿;0)
= a(y; ^ ￿):
Another especially convenient class of preferences are the linear risk tol-
erant preferences, which correspond in the standard consumer case to the
class of quasi-homothetic preferences, whose demands assume the Gorman
Polar form. We have:
De￿nition 6 Preferences satisfy linear risk tolerance if
V (w) = V
0 + wV
1;
where V 0;V 1 ￿ Y S:
The importance of the linear risk tolerant (LRT) class for state-dependent
preferences emerges in attempts to generalize the Pratt-Arrow notions of
11decreasing and increasing absolute risk aversion for state-dependent prefer-
ences. In his generalizations of these concepts, Karni (1985) restricts atten-
tion to autocomparable preferences. Preferences are autocomparable if the
reference set is a¢ ne.3
To admit the possibility of multiple solutions to the expected-value prob-
lem, we have:
De￿nition 7 An individual￿ s preferences are autocomparable for ^ ￿ if Y (^ ￿) =
Y 0 (^ ￿) + Y 1 (^ ￿) with Y 0 (^ ￿) = @E (^ ￿;0) ￿ Y S and Y 1 (^ ￿) a cone, i.e.,
￿Y 1 (^ ￿) ￿ Y 1 (^ ￿);￿ > 0:
Preferences can be autocomparable for some ^ ￿ but not for others. For
example, state-independent expected utility preferences are autocomparable
for the subjective probabilities that parametrize the expected-utility func-
tion, but not necessarily for other probabilities. It is trivial from what has
gone before that CARA, CRRA, and LRT preferences are all autocomparable
for all possible probability distributions. Generalized CARA preferences are
only autocomparable if the manifold [w fg (w)g is a cone, but in this case,
such preferences can always be renormalzied to be CARA preferences.
5.2 Decreasing and increasing absolute risk aversion
Quiggin and Chambers (2004) show that, like other notions of comparative
risk aversion, notions of decreasing and increasing absolute and relative risk
aversion are most compactly and usefully expressed in the language of super-
modularity theory. With the notions of risk ordering and the reference set,
developed above, it is straightforward to extend the de￿nition of decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA) presented by Quiggin and Chambers (2004)
for risk-averse state-independent preferences to the case of general reference
sets.
De￿nition 8 Preferences display DARA with respect to a risk ordering ￿￿
on E, for a given ￿; on Y if a(^ y(^ ￿;w) + "; ^ ￿) is submodular in w and "
The discussion of autocomparability presented above suggests an alterna-
tive approach, closer to that adopted by Karni. Suppose that the reference
3Karni (1985) uses the term linear, but his de￿nition is equivalent to requiring the
elements of a particular point in the reference set to be a¢ ne translates of one another.
12set for ^ ￿ takes the a¢ ne form
Y (^ ￿) = Y
0 (^ ￿) + Y
1 (^ ￿)
Under CARA; this will be true for all ￿; so Y 1 is independent of ￿: Hence,







= V (W (y))+cy
1
for all y;c and in particular all ^ y 2^ Y (^ ￿):
With decreasing risk-aversion, the addition of consumption c y1 (^ ￿) should
make the individual more willing to accept movement away from the reference
set, implying that, for all ^ y 2^ Y (^ ￿)
V (W (^ y))+cy








This kind of comparison is feasible only for autocomparable preferences.
These two approaches can be related using the following proposition,
which shows that the de￿nition based on autocomparable preferences is a
special case of the supermodularity de￿nition.
Proposition 9 Suppose There is no such reference in this version
of the paper?? is satis￿ed. Then preferences satisfy (6) if and only if
a(y+cy1 (^ ￿); ^ ￿) is submodular in c and y with respect to the ordering ￿0 :
Proof: Since the ordering ￿0 requires only ^ y(^ ￿; ^ ￿y) ￿0 y; and a(^ y(^ ￿; ^ ￿y); ^ ￿) =
0; a(y+my1 (^ ￿); ^ ￿) is submodular in c and y with respect to the ordering
￿0 if and only if a(y+cy1 (^ ￿); ^ ￿) is decreasing in c which will be true if and
only if (6) holds.
6 Implications for asset demand
We can now extend the results for the standard two-asset portfolio demand
problem to the case of preferences with an a¢ ne expansion set for ￿: Consider
an individual with reference set
^ y(^ ￿;w) =
￿




stochastic endowment e and wealth w We can￿ t use w as wealth. We
used it as welfare. Need to change it in what follows.that can be
13allocated between two assets, 1and 2, with payo⁄s y1 and y2 where y1 is the
direction of the reference set and
^ ￿y
2 = ^ ￿y
1 = 1
We will treat asset 1 as numeraire with price equal to 1, and denote the price
of asset 2 by p2 < 1: Thus, y1 and y2 correspond respectively to the safe
asset and the risky asset in the standard analysis. Let ￿ denote purchases of
the risky asset.











We will assume that the base allocation y0 is in the span of the market and





In particular, this encompasses the special case e = y0;b1 = b2 = 0:
We then obtain
Proposition 10 Assume preferences display DARA with respect to ￿1 :
Then the following are su¢ cient conditions for an increase in optimal pur-
chases of the asset: (i) an increase in wealth w; (ii) a reduction in the asset
price p2; (iii) the replacement of the return vector y2 by y20 where y20 ￿m y2:















Observe that y0 ￿1 y￿dy1 where
d = (￿ ￿ ￿
0)(1 ￿ p2)
The optimality of ￿ implies
a(y; ^ ￿) ￿ a(y
0; ^ ￿) < ￿
14Now consider a shift from initial wealth w to w+￿: If preferences display













and so the optimal allocation for wealth w + ￿ cannot be ￿0 < ￿: The other
cases are proved similarly.
7 Concluding comments
Models of state-dependent preferences have a number of attractive proper-
ties. Applicability of such models has, however, been limited by the lack of
analytical tools comparable to those available for state-independent prefer-
ences.
Using the state-contingent approach and the tools of modern consumer
and producer theory, much of the analysis of risk aversion developed for
state-independent preferences may be extended to the case of state-dependent
preferences. In particular, it is possible to make comparisons of risk aversion
with respect to a range of risk ordering.
Because state-contingent representations of problems involving uncer-
tainty exhibit the symmetry between production and consumption famil-
iar from analysis under certainty, a natural extension of the results derived
here is to consider their applicability to problems of production under un-
certainty, with the reference set being reinterpreted as an expansion path,
and risk-aversion being interpreted as the existence of a cost premium for
deviations from the expansion path. This issue will be addressed in future
work.
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